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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of moral hazard on dynamic insurance contract. It models
primary prevention in a two period model with classification risk. Agents’ preferences appear
to play an important role in the determination of preventive effort and prepayment. If absolute
prudence is larger that absolute risk aversion, moral hazard increases prepayment of premium and
classification risk . This highlights a tradeoff between prevention and prepayment that arises from
the classification risk. An increase in the difference between prudence and twice risk aversion
(that we define as the degree of foresight) moreover makes dynamic insurance contracts more
stable (when competing with spot insurance) if the cost of prevention is low enough when agents
preferences exhibit CRRA. Under a formulated utility function with linear reciprocal derivative,
we finally show that an increase in agents’ degree of foresight enhances the stability of dynamic
contract and the extent of prepayment.
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1 Introduction
Thanks to technological progress in medicine, people tend to live longer. If most individuals also live
healthier1, these technological progress moreover allows patients affected by chronic illness to have
higher life expectancy. This raises a new issue in medical insurance, as insurers tend to charge this
new class of agents – that needs to be covered for a long time against high expected heath cost of
treatment – with high premia. It therefore creates – for agents that contract a chronic condition – a
risk of being reclassified "high-risk" by his insurer and therefore to pay a high premium. Insurance
literature refers to this risk as the classification risk.
One possible option for reducing these premia is the use of to dynamic insurance, that is of long-
term insurance contract. This allows for risks mutualization through intra- and inter-generational
insurance. On the one hand, younger agents can subsidize older ones, as they expect to benefit form
similar subsidies when old. This subsidy corresponds to early payment of future premia, and is re-
ferred to as front-loading. On the other hand, when old, low risk may subsidize high risk agents.
These two mechanisms tend to decrease the premium of old agents highly exposed to risk, and there-
fore reduce classification risk.
This process however introduces new issues. First, intra-generational insurance may lead to the
exit of low risk policyholders. Insurance contract are characterized by one-side commitment and
agents that turn out to be low risk may have an incentive to leave the contract if they find more
profitable outside options (spot market for example). This phenomenon is sometimes refereed to as
(cream)-skimming.
The reduction of classification risk moreover raises a moral hazard issue. Being insured against the
risk of being considered high risk reduces the incentive to exert preventive efforts that decreases the
probability of becoming more risky. In the following we will refer to such effort - that can correspond
to safe behavior or to "hygieno-dietetic" regime for example - as primary prevention 2.
1The literature on medical science refers to this phenomenon as healthy ageing
2This terminology comes from medical science. The U.S. Preventative Services Task Forces’ Guide to Clinical Preven-
tive Services (2d edition, 1996) defines primary prevention as interventions that reduce the risk of disease occurrence in
otherwise healthy individuals. Secondary prevention measures then corresponds to identifying and treating "persons who
have already developed risk factors or preclinical disease but in whom the condition is not clinically apparent". It thus can
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Recent initiatives on insurance market have highlighted the interest for insurers, and especially
mutual insurers, for primary prevention. In 2005 and 2007 respectively, French mutual insurers AGF
and MAAF have begun to reimburse some alimentary products designed to lower the cholesterol level.
A similar program has also been introduced in 2005 by the Dutch insurer VGZ.
The aim of the present paper is to introduce the notion of primary prevention in dynamic insurance.
We define the optimal dynamic contract under moral hazard on the probability of becoming high risk.
We then analyze the impact of moral hazard on front-loading, classification risk and cream-skimming.
This way we are able to infer the stability of dynamic insurance contract that account for preventive
effort.
To do so we build a two-period model of mutual health insurance. During the first period, agents
are identically exposed to health risk and can invest in primary prevention. In period 2, agents can
either be high risk or low risk type. The amount of effort spent in period 1 reduces the probability
of being high risk that is the probability of having a high probability of falling ill in period 2. When
effort is observable and contractible upon, dynamic insurance fully insures against classification risk.
However, when effort is unobservable, the insurance offered during the second period depends on risk
type (that we assume to be observable and public information). This raises the issue of classification
risk.
This paper highlights a trade-off between two behaviors toward this future risk. On the one hand,
thanks to dynamic insurance, agents can transfer wealth between the two periods through prepayment
of premia (i.e. intergenerational insurance). By paying a higher premium during the first period, they
can reduce second period premia and classification risk. Such a mechanism can therefore be related to
precautionary savings3 and to the notion of prudence. On the other hand, to reduce the classification
risk, agents can exert effort of primary prevention. Such an effort, that reduces the probability of being
high risk in second period, seems to be related the concept of risk aversion (see. Jullien et al. 1999
for a discussion on the link between effort of prevention and risk aversion).
be related to "self-protection" (see Ehrlich and Becker 1972) or "loss prevention" (see Mehr and Commack 1966). Finally,
tertiary prevention concerns "care of established disease, with attempts made to minimize the negative effects of disease"
and thus correspond to "self-insurance" in Ehrlich and Becker 1972 or "loss protection" in 1966.
3By allowing an unequal repartition of the prepaid premium between the two states of the second period, prepayment
appears however more flexible than precautionary saving
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This suggests that the trade-off between the two means of reducing classification risk depends on
the ratio of (absolute) prudence to (absolute) risk aversion.
The present paper confirms this intuition and shows that the critical level of this ratio is 2. If
absolute prudence is larger than twice absolute risk aversion, to respond to future uncertainty, the
agents transfers wealth in second period rather than exerts effort, that is they foresee rather than
prevent. We will then refer to these agents as "farsighted". We show in this paper that, in case of
farsighted agents, moral hazard (through the unobservability of preventive efforts) increases the first
period premium (and hence enhances prepayment). On the contrary, if agents are not farsighted, that
is if they favor prevention (rather than inter-period transfers), moral hazard reduces classification risk
and intergenerational insurance. As a scope for public action, we also prove that the classification
risk can be reduced by a decrease in the cost of prevention (whatever the degree of foresight) or by
increasing the effectiveness of prevention when agents are farsighted.
With CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) preferences, it appears that an increase in agents’
degree of foresight leads to a decrease in the premium offered to low risk agents in second period,
if the cost of effort is low enough. Then, the more farsighted its policyholders, the less contestable
(by spot insurers) a mutual insurer that offers long-term contracts. After having defined a suitable
utility function - that satisfies the simplifying property of having a linear reciprocal derivative - we
moreover show that the various degrees of front-loading and lapsation observed in insurance contracts
(see Hendel and Lizzeri 2003) can be explained by heterogeneity in agents’ preferences. Lastly, we
highlight the fact that cross-subsidization allows to increase front-loading for agents with a strong
preference for present and therefore to improve the stability of dynamic contracts.
The issue of classification risk has received significant attention in the literature on long term
insurance. To reduce this risk that may make insurance unaffordable for most risky agents, Pauly et
al. (1995) propose guaranteed renewable insurance policies, that consists in a declining schedule of
premia over time. They construct a scheme in which the premium is always lower that the expected
future lifetime expenses of the lowest risk buyers. Frick (1998) however points out that such solution
may not be observed as it involves high premia early in life. If agents are too impatient and if they
face borrowing constraint, they will at most purchase partially guaranteed renewable insurance.
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Alternatively, Cochrane (1995) proposes time-consistent insurance contracts that provide insur-
ance against classification risk using severance payments. When an agent turn out to be high risk,
she receives a lump sum equals to the increased present value of his premium. Severance payments
compensate for changes in premium and allow every consumer to purchase insurance at his actuari-
ally fair premium. Pauly et al. (1998) argue that the effectiveness of this scheme highly relies on the
assumption of perfect credit market, and Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) point out that such contracts can
not be implemented in life insurance for legal reasons.
In a two-period model similar to ours, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) analyzes to what extend prepay-
ment of premia (front-loading) can reduce classification risk when accounting for cream-skimming.
They state that front-loading allows reducing both cream-skimming (low risk are insured at their
fair premium in second period) and classification risk (agents with different types have the same in-
surance contract)4. On the basis of these findings, they moreover argue that the various degrees of
front-loading and lapsation observed in insurance data can be explained by heterogeneous costs of
front-loading (that is by heterogeneous profiles of income growth).
Through primary preventive effort we add moral hazard to this model. To be incentive compat-
ible, the optimal contract then necessarily specifies different insurance schemes to different types.
This offers an alternative explanation to the stylized fact highlighted by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).
Accounting for moral hazard, the observed variety of front-loading and lapsation, can be explained by
heterogeneous behavior toward risk (risk aversion and prudence).
Our paper is not the first attempt to introduce moral hazard in dynamic insurance contract. Abbring
et al. (2003) use dynamic insurance contract in their empirical study on the distinction between moral
hazard and adverse selection. They however analyze moral hazard on the probability of accident,
that is secondary prevention. We focus here on primary prevention. An important implication of
the difference is that primary prevention - contrary to secondary prevention - leads to dynamic moral
hazard. The effort exerted in current period reduces the probability of being high risk next period.
4Contrary to us, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) allow for more than two risk types in second period
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Nishimura (2004) analyzes the effect of primary prevention on front loading in Hendel and Lizzeri’s
life insurance model. He characterizes the condition under which the optimal contract involves front-
loading. The emergence of front-loading depends on agents’ risk aversion and on the effectiveness of
prevention. He then studies capital market structure and the scope for government action. We how-
ever want to focus here on classification risk and on the conditions under which dynamic contracts
can prevent from agents to leave the company when they turn out to be low risk.
In the next session, we define the notion of foresight and analyze in which context it arises in
the economic literature. We present the model in section 3. The optimal dynamic contract under
moral hazard is defined in section 4 and general results of comparative statics are provided in Section
5. To go further in the analysis of comparative foresight we then rely on specific utility function in
section 6, and we interpret our results in term of sustainability of dynamic insurance with respect to
spot insurance in section 7. A brief extension with cross-subsidization among agents heterogeneous
in foresight is provided in section 8. We present a possible application of our model to unemployment
and life insurance in Section 9, and eventually outline our conclusion and directions for future research
in Section 9.
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2 The notion of foresight
It is now well established that the inverse of marginal utility (1/u′) plays a preponderant role in models
with model hazard. Our paper emphasizes the influence of the degree of concavity of this function,
that is (1/u′)′′ . This is not the first work where the second derivative of the inverse of marginal
utility matters. In a principal-agent model with moral hazard, Newman (1995) shows that, if 1/u′ is
convex, an increase in wealth makes the incentive scheme more expensive for the principal. Then,
the higher the initial wealth of the agent, the lower the expected profit of the principal. Thiele and
Wambach (1999) generalize this condition and state that for this statement to hold, it is sufficient to
assume that an agent with utility function 1/u′ is less risk adverse that an agent with utility function
u. This last condition corresponds to an absolute index of prudence (introduced by Kimball 1990)
smaller than three times the absolute index of risk-aversion (P ≤ 3A) when the convexity of the
inverse of marginal utility writes P ≤ 2A 5. In the general case, Amir and Czupryna (2004) prove
that P ≥ kA is equivalent to (k-2)-concavity of the first derivative of the inverse utility function.
Moreover, Eeckhouldt and Gollier (2000) show that two independent risks are substitutes if absolute
prudence is decreasing and larger than twice the absolute risk aversion.
The second derivative of the inverse of marginal utility function is also crucial in models with
uncertainty in the probability of damage. In studying environmental problems and the ’precautionary
principle’, Gollier et al. (2000) build a two-period model where the uncertain damage in second
stage depends on the consumption of both periods. They moreover assume that researchers work on
(Bayesianly) revising the beliefs on the distribution of uncertainty. One of their main results is that
a better information structure (that is beliefs more dispersed) decreases (resp. increases) the efficient
level of consumption in first stage if P ≥ 2A (resp. P ≤ 2A). In this sense, if prudence is larger than
twice risk aversion, progress induces precautionary savings.
5With constant relative risk aversion utility functions these condition is equivalent to a degree of relative risk aversion
larger than 1/2 and 1 respectively
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Gollier (2002) finds a similar result when analyzing a dynamic model of prevention with uncer-
tainty on the probability of loss and bayesian revisions. He assumes that, in both periods, agents can
exert an effort of (tertiary) prevention that reduces the amount of loss in case of damage and have the
possibility to save during the first period. Moreover, agents revise their belief about the probability of
loss in the second period on the basis of what they have observed during first stage. His main results
are that (i) an increase in the expected probability of loss increases (resp. decrease) the marginal value
of savings if 1/u′ is convex (resp. concave) and (ii) the uncertainty on the probability of loss increase
(resp. decrease) the efficient level of first stage effort if P ≤ 2A (resp. P ≥ 2A). Our model differs
from Gollier’s in at least two respects. First of all we allow for insurance in both stages when Gollier
(2002) only models savings in first stage. In the present paper, risk (of classification) is then endoge-
nous as it depends on insurance offered in both states of nature in second period. Moreover, whereas
Gollier studies self protection and bayesian revision of probability we analyze in this paper the effort
of primary prevention that is an effort that impacts the probability of having a high probability of
damage.
This brief review of literature highlights the trade-off that arises from an increase in future uncer-
tainty, between a decrease in present consumption (that is an increase in savings) and an increase in
effort. If P ≥ 2A, that is if 1/u′ is concave, the precautionary motive dominates and to face uncer-
tainty, the agents save rather than exert the effort. We therefore define such agents, that foresee rather
than prevent, as being "farsighted".
Definition 1 In the following, an agent will be said to be "farsighted" if and only if the inverse of the
marginal utility is concave, that is if the index of absolute prudence is larger that twice the index of
risk aversion.
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3 The Model
To analyze the impact of moral hazard on prepayment and classification risk, we build an overlapping
generation model (to capture the case of social insurance) with change in risk exposure during the life
cycle. We model the simplest 2-period, 2-type case and assume that (homogeneous) newborn agents
can affect their second period health status through primary prevention.
Consider overlapping generations (of same size) living for two periods t = 1, 2. At each period,
identical agents receive a sure revenue R. During the first period, (young) individuals face the same
risk, that is the same probability q1 of suffering a loss L. Let us note K1 ≡ −q1L the expected loss,
that is the expected health cost in the case of health insurance. At t = 2, (old) agents may be of two
types. Either, with probability p, they are low risk type and face a probability of loss ql2 (K
l
2 ≡ ql2L)
or, with probability 1 − p, they are high risk type and suffer loss with probability qh2 , with ql2 < qh2
(therefore K l2 < K
h
2 ≡ qh2L).
Information about agents’ risk type is revealed at the beginning of second period (for example through
medical check-ups) and is then public information. Young agents can exert a primary preventive effort
that reduces the probability of becoming high risk type in second period 6. We assume that agents
choose among two levels of prevention e and e (e < e) leading respectively to probabilities of being
low risk p(e) ≡ p and p(e) ≡ p, with p < p. Let us note ∆p ≡ p− p.
Let Xji be the wealth of agents of type j in period i. In the absence of insurance, the income
profile of a newborn agent can be schematized as follows
Figure 1: The income profile without insurance
6In our setting, an effort of secondary prevention would reduce ql2 and q
h
2 , and corresponds to self-protection; whereas
effort of tertiary prevention reduces L and corresponds to self-insurance
9
During the first period, the utility function is supposed to be separable in wealth and effort and
the utility-cost of exerting high effort of primary prevention is noted ψ ≡ ψ(e)− ψ(e). We moreover
assume time separability of preference (to distinguish saving and insurance behavior)7, and for the
sake of simplicity, that utility is linear in wealth during the first period.
Let us note u(.) (with u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0) the utility function of both types of old agents. We
assume that there is no direct utility loss due to health status. This would anyway worsen the welfare
of high risk agents and therefore advocate for a lower classification risk.
To be insured against this two-period risk, a (benevolent) mutual insurer offers to young agents
a dynamic insurance contract, that is a contract specifying premia and coverage for both periods and
depending on risk status in second period8. The timing of the game is described in Figure 2
Figure 2: The timing of the game
We moreover assume that there is no market insuring against the classification risk as proposed
by Tabarrok (1999) when studying the issue of genetic testing (he calls it "genetic insurance"). Here,
dynamic insurance contracts allow the insurer to use prepayment of premia in first period to decrease
the premium offered to high risk type agents when old (as shown in Hendel Lizzeri 2003).
7The use of incentive constraints prevent us to model Kreps-Porteus preferences. This would allow us to fully disentangle
risk and time effects. However, the use of such non-expected utility makes the problem untractable as it greatly complicates
the writing of the incentive compatible constraint
8The reader should note that the following problem also fits in the case of competing insurance companies that do not
seek to propose profitable one-period contract. We briefly discuss this alternative interpretation in Section 6.
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However, when effort is unobservable and not contractible upon, this may lower the incentive to
exert high preventive effort. The aim of this paper is thus to analyze the trade-off resulting from a
decrease in premium of high risk in second period, between an increase in insurance and a decrease
in the incentive for primary preventive effort. This then allows us to analyze under which condition
the optimal contract resulting from this trade-off is sustainable when we introduce the possibility of
one-period (spot) insurance.
Note here that prepayment of premia can be related to precautionary saving as it corresponds to
an intertemporal transfer of wealth used to deal with future uncertainty. These two mechanisms are
however different in fundamental respect that plays a important role in our setting. Indeed, whereas
savings have the same return in every future state (and therefore don’t have much impact on classi-
fication risk), the insurance company can choose to reallocate the prepaid part of premia differently
across the states (what can have an important impact on classification risk).
4 The optimal dynamic contract
4.1 The benchmark case of observable effort
It is first easy to show, using the concavity of the utility function, that the dynamic insurance contract
necessarily specify complete insurance (in the sense that it provides an agent with the same wealth
whether she suffers the damage or not) once risk types are known 9. A dynamic contract is therefore
fully defined by a triplet (Π1,Πl2,Π
h
2) of premia corresponding respectively to the expected costs K1,
K l2 and K
h
2 , and the coverage is in any cases equal to the amount of the loss L. Under this dynamic
insurance contract, the income profile of a newborn agent can then be schematized as follows:
9This issue is more problematic in Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) and Nishimura (2004) that model life insurance and
therefore specify state (alive/dead) dependent utility function
11
Figure 3: The income profile under the insurance contract
The risk of being classified high risk is then measured by the difference between the second period
premia.
Definition 2 The classification risk corresponds to the risk of being classified high risk by his insurer
and therefore to paid a high premium. In our two-type model with complete insurance in each state,
this risk is simply measured by the spread between the premia paid by each type in second period:
Πh2 −Πl2
The mutual insurance firm, as non profit organization, then seek to maximize the expected utility of a
young individual that exert an effort e:
(R−Π1)− ψ(e) + p(e)u
(
R−Πl2
)
+ (1− p(e))u
(
R−Πh2
)
(4.1)
By definition the use of external capital is excluded in a mutual organization. However, if the mutual
insurer is large enough, it can rely on the law of large numbers, and the zero profit condition writes
Π1 + p(e)Πl2 + (1− p(e))Πh2 = K1 + p(e)K l2 + (1− p(e))Kh2 ≡ E(K|e) (4.2)
This states that the sum of premia collected (from young and old agents) allows (in expectation) for
the reimbursement of heath costs. Recall here that we consider an overlapping generation model with
identical agents (that therefore exert the same prevention effort) and generations of the same size.
With observable effort it is then optimal to set Πl2
∗ = Πh2
∗ = Π∗2 such that u′(R − Π∗2) = 1 and
Π∗1 = E(K|e) − Π∗2. Therefore, the optimal premia in second stage are independent of the level of
preventive effort and there is no classification risk at the optimum. However, the premium paid at first
stage is decreasing with the level of effort as p(e) > p(e)⇒ K ≡ E(K|e = e) < E(K|e = e) ≡ K.
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Therefore, without moral hazard, assuming K −K > ψ the optimal contract specifies:
e = e
Πl2
∗ = Πh2
∗ ≡ Π∗2 with u′(R−Π∗2) = 1
Π∗1 = K −Π∗2
(4.3)
4.2 The optimal dynamic contract under moral hazard
Now, if efforts of primary prevention are not observable, that is under moral hazard, agents have an
incentive the exert the maximal level of effort if the insurance contract satisfies
u(R−Πl2)− u(R−Πh2) ≥
ψ
∆pi
(4.4)
Therefore, the optimal contract that gives the incentive to exert the high level of effort10 is solution of:
max
Π1,Πl2,Π
h
2
(R−Π1)− ψ + pu
(
R−Πl2
)
+ (1− p)u
(
R−Πh2
)
(4.5)
s.t.

Π1 + pΠl2 + (1− p)Πh2 ≥ K
u(R−Πl2)− u(R−Πh2) ≥
ψ
∆p
The contract solution of this program then represents the overall optimum if it provides agents with
more expected utility that the contract (K − Π∗2,Π∗2,Π∗2), the optimal contract with low effort. We
only focus in the following on the optimal incentive compatible contract. We don’t discuss the issue
of the optimal level of effort and rather assume that it is optimal for all agents to exert the maximal
level of effort11.
10The generalization to continuous effort seems difficult as it would introduce marginal utility in the program through a
two-step optimization. However, our model seems to be easy generalizable to a finite number of effort levels. As we focus
on the incentive to exert the maximal level of effort, the contract would be incentive compatible if for each level of effort,
the benefit of exerting the highest effort outweighs the cost. The binding incentive constraint would then correspond to the
level of effort that has the highest cost-benefit ratio.
11In a static model, Jullien et al. (1999) gives condition under which more risk-averse agents optimally exert more effort
of secondary and tertiary prevention (self-insurance and self-protection)
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The experienced reader should note that the program (4.5) can be easy related to a principal-agent
model with outside option effect that can be formulated (in a two-state, two-level of effort case) as:
max
X1,Xl2,X
h
2
X1 (4.6)
s.t.

X1 + pX l2 + (1− p)Xh2 ≤W
u(X l2)− u(Xh2 ) ≥
ψ
∆p
pu(X l2) + (1− p)u(Xh2 ) ≥ u(Y )
where X1 represent the principal payoff; X l2 and X
h
2 the revenues of the agent in two states that occur
with respective probability p and (1− p) when the agent exerts the effort at a cost of utility ψ; W the
total wealth and Y the outside option of the agent. The result of Thiele and Wambach (1999), induces
in the setting that if P > 3A - and consequently if the agent is farsighted - under unobservable efforts
makes the incentive scheme less expensive for the principal
(∂X1
∂Y
is higher under moral hazard than
if effort is observable
)
.
Foresight will also play a preponderant role in our setting when analyzing the impact of moral
hazard. The solution of program (4.5) is defined by:
u(R−Πl2∗∗)− u(R−Πh2∗∗) =
ψ
∆p
p
u′
(
R−Πl2∗∗
) + 1− p
u′
(
R−Πh2∗∗
) = 1
Π∗∗1 = K − pΠl2∗∗ − (1− p)Πh2∗∗ = K − E(Π∗∗2 )
(4.7)
Therefore, if (1/u′) is concave (resp. convex), the optimal incentive contract under moral hazard
satisfies
1
u′
(
R−K + Π∗∗1
) = 1
u′ (R− E (Π∗∗2 ))
>
pi
u′
(
R−Πl2∗∗
) + 1− pi
u′
(
R−Πh2∗∗
) = 1 ( resp.
1
u′
(
R−K + Π∗∗1
) < 1).
As, under observable effort,
1
u′(R−K + Π∗1)
=
1
u′(R−Π∗2)
= 1, the next proposition hold.
Proposition 1 If agents are farsighted (resp. not farsighted) in second period, moral hazard enhances
(resp. reduces) prepayment of premia
(
as then Π∗∗1 > Π∗1, resp. Π∗∗1 < Π∗1
)
.
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Proposition 1 can be linked with the finding of Gollier et al. (2000). They state that if P ≥ 2A,
better information structure reduces the efficient level of consumption in first period. They define a
"better information structure" as a more dispersed probability distribution. Therefore, it corresponds to
more uncertainty. In our setting, moral hazard also correspond to more uncertainty as under observable
effort, agents have the same level of wealth in second period whatever their type. As in Gollier
et al. (2000) if P ≥ 2A, this leads to a decrease in first period consumption through an increase
in the premium paid in first stage. Gollier et al. (2000) interpret this condition as coming from
two conflicting effects that arises from an increase in uncertainty. First, the increase in uncertainty
decreases first period consumption because of ’precautionary motives’. This effect is more important
the larger the index of absolute produce P introduced by Kimball (1990). However, as agents are risk
adverse, the increase in uncertainty reduces expected wealth in second period. Therefore, it increases
the marginal value on first period revenue and thus tends to reduce prepayment. The intensity of this
effect is reflected by the index of absolute risk aversion A. They state that the first effect dominates if
the index of absolute prudence is larger than twice the index of absolute risk aversion, that is if agents
are farsighted.
In our context, the condition P ≥ 2A can also be related to the moral hazard concerns. First, the
uncertainty during second period leads to prepayment of premia (that may be linked with precaution-
ary saving) if prudence is high. In our setting, through the zero profit condition, this increases average
wealth in second period. Then, because of the concavity of the utility function, the optimal contract
has to exhibit a higher classification risk (a higher spread between second period premia) to remain
incentive compatible. This last effect goes against an increase in first period premium, and dominates
if agents are "too risk adverse" relatively to their prudence. Proposition 1 states that the will be the
case if AP ≥ 12 .
Now turn to second period premia. The first order condition gives p
u′(R−Πl2
∗∗) +
1−p
u′(R−Πh2
∗∗)
= 1
u′(R−Π∗2)
. Moreover, the incentive constraint implies Πl2 < Π
h
2 . This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Whatever the extent of prepayment of premia when young, the unobservability of ef-
fort improves the welfare of low risk agents and worsens the welfare of high risk agents when old.
Therefore, it increases classification risk.
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This result is mainly driven by the incentive scheme. The first order condition leads to decreasing
relationship between Πl2 and Π
h
2 and is satisfied at the first best contract
(
Πl2 = Π
h
2 = Π
∗
2
)
. Now,
to be incentive compatible, the optimal contract necessarily specifies Πl2 < Π
h
2 . Therefore, at the
optimum Πl2 < Π
∗
2 < Π
h
2 .
It is worthwhile to note that second period premia are fully determined by the first order condition
and the incentive constraint. The feasibility constraint then determines the premium paid when young
depending on expected second period premia. This allows analyzing the solution graphically. To do
so let us recall X1 ≡ R−Π1−ψ, X l2 ≡ R−Πl2, Xh2 ≡ R−Πh2 and study the optimal premia in the
plan (X l2, X
h
2 ).
Consider first the incentive constraint u
(
X l2
)
−u
(
Xh2
)
= ψ∆p . In the plan (X
l
2, X
h
2 ) it defines an
increasing and concave curve below the 45-degree line (labeled IC in Figure 4). Moreover, the distance
between the incentive constraint and the 45-degree line is increasing in X l2 as the function f
(
X l2
)
=
X l2−u−1
(
u
(
X l2
)
− ψ∆p
)
is increasing inX l2 when u
′
(
X l2
)
< u′
[
u−1
(
u
(
X l2
)
− ψ∆p
)]
= u′
(
Xh2
)
.
In the plan
(
X l2, X
h
2
)
the first order condition
p
u′
(
R−Πl2∗∗
) + 1− p
u′
(
R−Πh2∗∗
) = 1 (labeled
FOC in Figure 4), corresponds to a decreasing curve going through point (X∗2 , X∗2 ). It is moreover
tangent to the line pX l2 + (1− p)Xh2 = X∗2 at (X∗2 , X∗2 ), convex is agents are farsighted and concave
otherwise.
On the basis of those two curves, we can then infer the first period wealth with the zero-profit
condition that can be written as E(X2) = −X1 + 2R− (K +ψ). This effect is represented in Figure
4 through the line E(X2) = c.
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Figure 4: The impact of foresight on second period premia
This graphical analysis highlights that, depending on foresight, moral hazard has different effects
on second period premia. It first appears that whatever the concavity of 1/u′, an "incentive" effect
leads - relative to the complete information benchmark - to an increase in wealth for low risk agents
(decrease in Πl2) and a decrease in wealth for high risk agents. Graphically this corresponds to a
move along the line E(X2) = c from point F to point I . This effect is combined with a "foresight"
effect that depends on the concavity of 1/u′. Indeed, if 1/u′ is concave (left hand side figure) the
"incentive" effect is coupled with a move to the north-east along the incentive constraint from point
I to S1. Therefore, when agents are farsighted, the "foresight" effect corresponds to a decrease in
both second period premia. This last effect moreover leads to the increase in prepayment described in
proposition 1, as it move the line E(X2) = c upward.
The reverse effect (represented by a move from I to S2) holds when 1/u′ is convex (right hand
side figure). The "foresight" effect then corresponds to a decrease in both X l2 and X
h
2 (that leads to
the increase in X1 found in Proposition 1). However, as the first order condition is decreasing, the
"incentive" effect always dominates and Proposition 2 holds.
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Propositions 1 and 2 confirm our interpretation in term of foresight of the condition P ≥ 2A. As
shown in Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2005), prudence, as well as risk aversion, can be interpreted as
a preference toward risk. Here we show how these two kinds of preferences can be linked. In our
setting, agents can use two mechanisms to reduce classification risk in second period. Either they can
exert a preventive effort that reduces the probability of becoming high risk, or they can transfer wealth
from period 1 to period 2 though prepayment of premia. Via an analogy to precautionary saving, this
last mechanism can be linked with the notion of prudence, whereas the latter one is related to risk
aversion.
Here we show that the preference for one mechanism to another is driven by the ratio absolute
prudence to absolute risk aversion and more precisely, by the position of the ratio with respect to a
critical level equal to 2.
As in the literature we discussed in section 3.2, the condition P − 2A ≥ 0 therefore comes
from a trade-off between a decrease in present consumption and an increase in preventive effort, that
arises from second period uncertainty (here moral hazard generates classification risk). If agents are
farsighted (that is if P ≥ 2A), they prefer to transfer wealth from period 1 to period 2 rather than
to exert effort, when they face classification risk. In this sense they rather foresee than prevent. In
our setting this materialized therefore in an increase in front-loading (Π∗∗1 > Π∗1) and a more difficult
incentive scheme. It is then necessary to specify a large spread between second period premia to make
sure that farsighted agents exert the effort (see Figure 4). The reverse effort holds for non farsighted
agents that rather exert preventive effort than transfer wealth. As transferring wealth correspond in our
setting to an increase in insurance against second period health cost, non farsighted agents’ preferences
correspond to the adage "an once of prevention is worth than a pound of cure". In this case, lower
classification risk is therefore incentive compatible and uncertainty reduces prepayment of premia.
It seems important to note here that the reluctance of farsighted agents to exert effort, does not
come from time inconsistency (as it can for example arise from beta-delta preferences a la Laibson
1997). Indeed, farsighted agents are perfectly time consistent but do not choose preventive effort
(but rather wealth transfers) to face future uncertainty. This behavior may be caused by the uncertain
nature of prevention relative to the predetermined (by the insurance contract) returns of prepayment.
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5 Comparative Statics:
How to Reduce Classification Risk?
In this section, we analyze the effect of the different parameters of the model on optimal premia. By
defining which variables affect classification risk, we are then able to formulate some policy recom-
mendations on the ways to reduce this kind of risk that produces inequalities. Our model contains
three classes of variables: the variables regarding the income process (the sure revenue R and the ex-
pected health cost Kji ), those regarding the preventive effort (the cost of effort ψ and the probabilities
of being low type for both level of effort p and p) and the variables relative to the behavior toward risk
(the degrees of foresight, prudence and risk aversion) included in the utility function.
It is firstly worthwhile to note that – mainly because of the hypothesis of linear first period utility –
the variables relating to the income process play a minor role in the determination of optimal premia.
There is indeed no wealth effect in our model in the sense that all premia are proportional to sure
revenue
(
dΠl2
dR =
dΠh2
dR = −dΠ1dR = 1
)
. Moreover, the expected costs of health only impact positively
the first period premium (through the zero profit condition) and have no influence on reclassification
risk.
5.1 Reduce the Cost of Primary Preventive Effort
The cost of primary preventive effort appears to be a first tool on which policymaker (using sub-
sidizes) or insurer (as in the example presented in the introduction) may act. Through the system
(4.7), our model allows to analyze of the impact of this cost ψ on optimal premia and especially on
reclassification risk.
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To do so let us differentiate the solution system with respect to Π1, Πl2, Π
h
2 and ψ. This leads to:
−u′(R−Πl2)dΠl2 + u′(R−Πh2)dΠh2 = dψ∆p
p
u
′′ (
R−Πl2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]2dΠl2 + (1− p) u
′′ (
R−Πh2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πh2
)]2dΠh2 = 0
dΠ1 + pdΠl2 − (1− p)dΠh2 = 0
With the first two equations one gets
dΠh2
dψ
= ∆p
pu
′′ (
R−Πl2
) [
u′
(
R−Πh2
)]2
(1− p)u′′ (R−Πh2) [u′ (R−Πl2)]3 + pu′′ (R−Πl2) [u′ (R−Πh2)]3 > 0
dΠl2
dψ
= −∆p
(1− p)u′′
(
R−Πh2
) [
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]2
(1− p)u′′ (R−Πh2) [u′ (R−Πl2)]3 + pu′′ (R−Πl2) [u′ (R−Πh2)]3 < 0
and therefore
dΠ1
dψ
= p (1− p) ∆p
u
′′ (
R−Πh2
) [
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]2 − u′′ (R−Πl2) [u′ (R−Πh2)]2
(1− p)u′′ (R−Πh2) [u′ (R−Πl2)]3 + pu′′ (R−Πl2) [u′ (R−Πh2)]3
This allows us to formulate the following proposition on the impact of a decrease in ψ
Proposition 3 A decrease in the cost of tertiary prevention
• decreases classification risk (as it increases the premium paid by low risk and decreases the
premium paid by high risk agents)
• decreases prepayment if agents are farsighted (increases it otherwise)
The effect on classification risk is quite straightforward. A decrease in the cost of prevention enhances
the incentive to exert the effort. Therefore, the insurance contract can exhibit a lower classification risk
and remain incentive compatible. Therefore, if a policymaker wants to reduce the inequality resulting
from classification risk he should work on reducing the cost of prevention. By the same mechanism
as for Proposition 1, this will then decrease (resp. increase) prepayment if P > 2A (resp. P < 2A).
These effects can also be displayed graphically as an increase in ψ corresponds to a downward shit of
the incentive curve.
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Moreover, the same effects can be induced by a decrease in the probability of being low risk when
not exerting the effort: p. These changes in p are however difficult to interpret as it corresponds to a
change in the probability for the agents that don’t exert the effort, keeping the probability for those
that exert the effort constant.
5.2 Increase the Effectiveness of Primary Prevention
The role of the probability of being low risk when exerting the preventive effort is more easily under-
standable. Indeed, an increase in p, keeping p constant, can be interpreted as an improvement of the
effectiveness of prevention. For example, investing in research on primary prevention, can increase
the probability for the effort to lead to low risk type. It therefore opens a new spectrum for public
policy.
Using (4.7), comparative statics on changes in p gives
dΠl2
dp
= −
1
u′
(
R−Πl2
) − 1
u′
(
R−Πh2
) − (1− p) ψ
(∆p)2
u′′
(
R−Πh2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πh2
)]3
u′
(
R−Πl2
) p u′′
(
R−Πl2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]3 + (1− p) u
′′ (
R−Πh2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πh2
)]3
 > 0
dΠl2
dp
= −
1
u′
(
R−Πl2
) − 1
u′
(
R−Πh2
) + p ψ
(∆p)2
u′′
(
R−Πl2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]3
u′
(
R−Πl2
) p u′′
(
R−Πh2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πl2
)]3 + (1− p) u
′′ (
R−Πh2
)
[
u′
(
R−Πh2
)]3

This leads to
Proposition 4 An increase in the probability of being low risk type in second period when exerting
the preventive effort
• increases the optimal premium paid by low risk agents in second stage
• decreases classification risk if agents are farsighted
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First, an increase in the probability of being low risk for agents that exert the preventive effort
(keeping constant this probability for agents that don’t exert effort) increases the benefit of effort. It is
then easier to provide the incentive to exert effort. The optimal contract can therefore lead to a lower
welfare in good state of nature and still be incentive compatible.
Through the incentive constraint, this implies a decrease in second period premium for risky
agents. However, the increases in p also decreases the weight attached to this bad state in the objective
function. This leads to a decrease in optimal wealth of high risk. The combination of these two effects
is ambiguous. Therefore, the effect of an increase in p on the expected wealth in second period is also
ambiguous and we can not conclude on the impact of this increase on first period wealth.
However, it is possible to state that an increase in the probability of being low risk decreases the
risk of classification when agents are farsighted:
d(Xl2−Xh2 )
dp =
[
1
u′(Xl2)
− 1
u′(Xh2 )
]2
+ p
u′(Xl2)u′(Xh2 )
ψ
(∆p)2
[
u′′(Xh2 )
[u′(Xh2 )]
3−
u′′(Xl2)
[u′(Xl2)]
3
]
− ψ
∆p
u′′(Xh2 )
[u′(Xh2 )]
3
u′(Xl2)
p
u
′′(Xl2)
[u′(Xl2)]
3 +(1−p)
u
′′(Xh2 )
[u′(Xh2 )]
3
Therefore, if agents are farsighted, the policymaker can reduce the classification risk by improving
the effectiveness of primary prevention, for example through investments in medical research.
5.3 Comparative foresight
In the previous sections we have highlighted the important role of foresight on the determination of
optimal premia. Whether agents are farsighted or not, widely impacts the consequences moral hazard
has on premia. This raises the question of the influence of changes in the degree of foresight, that is
in the concavity of 1/u′. To study this issue let us first define formally the degree of foresight.
Definition 3 An agent v with second period utility function v(.), will be said to have a higher degree
of foresight (or to be more farsighted) than agent u with second period utility function u(.) if 1/v′(.)
is a concave transformation of 1/u′.
Remark 1 The equivalent to state that v is more farsighted than u if Pv(x) − 2Av(x) ≥ Pu(x) −
2Au(x)∀x
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Proof:
1
v′
((
1
u′
)−1
(t)
)
= g(t) with g increasing and concave
⇒ g′(t) =
v
′′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
)
[
v′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
)]2 .
[
u
′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
)]2
u′′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
) = Av
((
1
u
′
1
)−1
(t)
)
u
′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
)
Au
((
1
u
′
1
)−1
(t)
)
v′
((
1
u
′
)−1
(t)
)
⇒ g is concave if and only if ddx log
(
Av(x)u
′
(x)
Au(x)v
′ (x)
)
≤ 0
⇔ A
′
v(x)
Av(x)
+ u
′′
(x)
u′ (x) −
A
′
u(x)
Au(x)
− v
′′
(x)
v′ (x) ≤ 0
⇔ Pv(x)− 2Av(x) ≥ Pu(x)− 2Au(x)
Comparative statics on foresight then comes to compare utility functions. The effect of an increase
in foresight is therefore hard to grasp as it also implies changes in incentive constraint and in first best
contract. Therefore, to explicit results on the effect of foresight on optimal dynamic contract, it is
necessary to impose further assumptions on preferences.
6 Explicit Examples
6.1 The case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion
The first convenient way to specify the utility function is to assume that agents’ preferences are repre-
sented by CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility functions. CRRA utility functions indeed
exhibit some interesting properties. If
u(x) =

x1−γ
1−γ for γ > 0, γ 6= 1
ln(x) for γ = 1
A(x) = γx and P (x) =
γ+1
x . Therefore, if agents v and u are both characterized by CRRA utility
function with respective parameters γv and γu, from remark 1, v is more farsighted than u if γv < γu.
CRRA utility functions also exhibit the convenient feature of leading to the same first best contract(
K −R+ 1, R− 1, R− 1
)
whatever the parameter of risk aversion (u′(X∗2 ) = 1⇔ X∗2 = 1∀γ > 0).
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Consider two types of agents characterized by two CRRA utility functions v(.) and u(.) such that
1/v′ = φ ◦ (1/u′) with φ(.) increasing and concave; that is agents of type v are more farsighted than
agents of type u.
If policyholders are of type v the optimal contract
(
Π∗∗1v,Πl2v
∗∗
,Πh2v
∗∗) has to satisfy

p
v′
(
R−Πl2v∗∗
) + 1− p
v′
(
R−Πh2v∗∗
) = 1
v(R−Πl2v∗∗)− v(R−Πh2v∗∗) =
ψ
∆p
Π∗∗1v = K − pΠl2v∗∗ − (1− p)Πh2v∗∗
whereas if agents are characterized by the utility function u(.) the optimal incentive compatible con-
tract is the triplet
(
Π∗∗1u,Πl2u
∗∗
,Πh2u
∗∗) such that

p
u′
(
R−Πl2u∗∗
) + 1− p
u′
(
R−Πh2u∗∗
) = 1
u(R−Πl2u∗∗)− u(R−Πh2u∗∗) =
ψ
∆p
Π∗∗1u = K − pΠl2u∗∗ − (1− p)Πh2u∗∗
Consider the relative position of the curve characterized by the first two equations of each system
in the plan
(
X l2, X
h
2
)
.
Regarding the first order conditions, one of the properties of CRRA utility functions turns out to
be crucial. All CRRA utility functions leading to the same first best contract we necessarily have
1
v′(1) = φ
(
1
u′(1)
)
= 1u′(1) = 1 that is φ(1) = 1. Therefore
p
v′(R−Πl2v
∗∗) +
1−p
v′(R−Πh2v
∗∗) = pφ
(
1
v′(R−Πl2v
∗∗)
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
1
v′(R−Πh2v
∗∗)
)
= 1
⇒ p
v′(R−Πl2v
∗∗) +
1−p
v′(R−Πh2v
∗∗) > φ
−1(1) = 1 = p
u′(R−Πl2u
∗∗) +
1−p
u′(R−Πh2u
∗∗)
as φ is increasing and concave. The function 1/u′ being increasing, this implies that in the plan(
X l2, X
h
2
)
, the first order condition of agents v (labeled FOCv in Figure 5) is higher than the one of
agents u (labeled FOCu), although they both have the same tangency at (X∗2 , X∗2 ).
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As stated in previous section this effect is however coupled with an effect on the incentive con-
straint. In the case of CRRA utility function, the incentive constraint becomes (X
l
2)
1−γ
1−γ −
(Xh2 )
1−γ
1−γ =
ψ
∆p . In the plan
(
X l2, X
h
2
)
, the slope of the incentive constraint writes dX
h
2
dXl2
=
(
Xh2
Xl2
)γ
< 1 and is
decreasing in γ. Therefore, an increase in foresight makes the slope of the incentive constraint turn
counter-clockwise (from ICu to ICv in Figure 5). We are however unable to define when the incen-
tive constraints of both individuals cross and the graphical analysis is not sufficient to conclude in this
case.
Figure 5: Comparative foresight in the case of CRRA preferences
Let us therefore turn to an analytical analysis.
With CRRA preferences, the optimal second period contract is described by the system

(
X l2
)1−γ
1− γ −
(
Xh2
)1−γ
1− γ =
ψ
∆p
p
(
X l2
)γ
+ (1− p)
(
Xh2
)γ
= 1
(6.1)
25
Therefore,
dX l2
dγ
= −
ψ
∆p(1− γ) −
1
1− γ ln
(
X l2
) (
X l2
)1−γ
+
1
γ(1− γ) ln
(
Xh2
) (
Xh2
)1−γ
+
p
1− p
1
γ
ln
(
X l2
) (
X l2
)γ (
Xh2
)1−2γ
1
(1− p)
(
X l2
)γ−1 [
(1− p) (X l2)1−2γ + p (Xh2 )1−2γ]
dXh2
dγ
=
ψ
∆p(1− γ) −
1
γ(1− γ) ln
(
X l2
) (
X l2
)1−γ
+
1
1− γ ln
(
Xh2
) (
Xh2
)1−γ − 1− p
p
1
γ
ln
(
Xh2
) (
Xh2
)γ (
X l2
)1−2γ
1
p
(
Xh2
)γ−1 [
(1− p) (X l2)1−2γ + p (Xh2 )1−2γ]
As X∗2 = 1∀γ > 0, from Proposition 2, ln
(
X l2
)
> 0 and ln
(
Xh2
)
< 0. Therefore, if γ > 1, the
three last terms of both numerators are positive and next proposition holds
Proposition 5 If agents’ preferences in second period are represented by a Constant Relative Risk
Aversion utility function with risk coefficient larger than one, an increase in the degree of foresight
• decreases the premium paid by low risk agents
• increases the premium paid by high risk agents
• and thus increases classification risk
in second period, provided the cost of effort is low enough (relative to its benefits)
Indeed, when (1− γ) < 0, provided the first term of the numerators is low enough relative to the
other terms, the optimal wealth in second stage decreases with the coefficient of risk aversion γ when
the agent turns out to low risk
(
dXl2
dγ > 0
)
and increases with γ for high risk agents
(
dXh2
dγ < 0
)
. In
the case of CRRA utility functions, the degree of foresight increases when γ decreases and Proposition
5 follows.
This result can be explained by the two effects induced by the increase in foresight already high-
lighted. First, the pure foresight effect, represented by the move of the first order condition in the plan
(X l2, X
h
2 ) presented above, leads to a decrease in both second period premia (and an increase in first
period premium). Proposition 5 states that the incentive effect highly depends on the cost of effort.
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This mainly comes from the influence of moves in γ on the level of utility reached for low level of
wealth. Indeed, an increase in the coefficient of relative risk aversion has a large impact on low levels
of utility, whereas the change in utility for high level of consumption is relatively small (cf. Gollier
2001 Figure 2.2). This impacts the intensity of the counter-clockwise move of the incentive constraint.
When the needed spread between wealth is low (low level of ψ∆p ), the incentive constraints of agents
having different CRRA utility functions cross for high level of wealth. Therefore, the first order
condition of more farsighted agents crosses their incentive constraint when it is below the incentive
constraint of less farsighted agents (as in the case represented in Figure 5).
Then, the combination of the two effects leads to an increase in wealth of low risk agents and a
decrease in wealth of high risk. However, when ψ∆p is too high, the incentive constraints of two agents
may cross before crossing the first order condition, leading to the reverse effects (a decrease in X l2
and an increase in Xh2 ).
The restriction to non-farsighted agents (γ > 1) may seem awkward, but is pretty standard in
the case of CRRA utility function. For example, Gollier (2001) argues that this condition holds for
most households in real economy. This moreover corresponds to the necessary condition for utility
to be unbounded below, which is a standard assumption in principal-agents models (see for example
Grossman and Hart 1983). It notably ensures that no nonnegativity constraints on income bind at the
optimum.
Proposition 5 moreover have implications on first period premium. From the zero profit condition,
dΠ1
dγ = −p
dΠl2
dγ −(1− p)
dΠl2
dγ . Therefore, for high value of p, the effect of low risk premium dominates.
Then, in the configuration of proposition 5, the first stage premium increases in foresight. This is
confirmed and generalized by the study of the system
(
X l2
)1−γ
1− γ −
(
Xh2
)1−γ
1− γ =
ψ
∆p
p
(
X l2
)γ
+ (1− p)
(
Xh2
)γ
= 1
X1 + pX l2 + (1− p)Xh2 = 2R−K
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that gives
dX1
dγ
=
{
(1− p)2 (Xh2 )2γ ln (Xh2 )+ p2 (X l2)2γ ln (X l2)+ p (1− p) γ(1− γ)2 [ (Xh2 )γ− 12 (X l2) 12
− (X l2)γ− 12 (Xh2 ) 12 ]2 + p (1− p)1− γ ( ln (Xh2 )Xh2 (X l2)γ [(Xh2 )γ−1 − (X l2)γ−1]
+ ln
(
X l2
)
X l2
(
Xh2
)γ [(
X l2
)γ−1 − (Xh2 )γ−1] )
}[
γ
(
p
(
X l2
)2γ−1
+ (1− p) (Xh2 )2γ−1)]−1
The first term being the only negative one, it turns out that, when the probability of being high risk
type (1− p) is low enough, an increase in foresight increases the first period premium. Simulations
with CRRA preferences (cf. Appendix) moreover points out that this seems to be the case whatever
the probability of being high risk. The intuitive effects driving Proposition 1 therefore seems to be
generalizable to changes in the degree of foresight.
We are unable to determine analytically the limit cost of effort in Proposition 5. However, this can
be done when analyzing the welfare in the good state of nature. To do so let us consider the following
change of variables. If we define Y l2 ≡ u(X l2) and f ≡ u−1, we have u(Xh2 ) = Y l2 − ψ∆p and the
system defining the second period premia simplifies in
H(Y l2 ) ≡ pf ′(Y l2 ) + (1− p) f ′(Y l2 −K) = 1 (6.2)
In the case of CRRA preferences,
f (Y ) = exp
[
1
1− γ ln ((1− γ)Y )
]
and f ′ (Y ) = exp
[
γ
1− γ ln ((1− γ)Y )
]
(f ′) being increasing, it follows from (6.2) that
sgn
(
∂Y l2
∂γ
)
= −sgn
(
p
∂f ′
∂γ
(Y l2 ) + (1− p)
∂f ′
∂γ
(Y l2 −K)
)
Then, as sgn
(
∂f ′
∂γ
(Y )
)
= sgn (ln ((1− γ)Y )− γ), one gets
∂f ′
∂γ
(Y ) ≥ 0⇔ Y ≤ Yγ ≡ e
γ
1− γwhenγ > 1
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Therefore, a sufficient condition for the welfare in low state to be increasing with foresight
(
∂Y l2
∂γ ≤ 0
)
,
is Y l2 (and thus Y
l
2 −K) to be lower than Yγ . As H(Y l2 ) is increasing, this condition is equivalent to
H(Yγ) ≥ 1, for which a sufficient condition is f ′(Yγ −K) ≥ 1 that is ψ∆p ≤
eγ − 1
1− γ .
Proposition 6 If agents’ preferences in second period are represented by a Constant Relative Risk
Aversion utility function with risk coefficient larger than one, an increase in foresight increases the
welfare of low risk agents in second period, if
ψ
∆p
≤ e
γ − 1
1− γ .
We however can not infer results on level of wealth (and thus on premia) from this proposition as the
coefficient of relative risk aversion doesn’t have a monotonic impact on utility derived from a given
level of wealth (see Gollier 2001, Figure 2.2).
6.2 A suitable utility function with linear reciprocal derivative
To go further in the analysis of the impact of foresight on premia and have clearer results, it is accom-
modating to build a suitable utility function that satisfies additional simplifying properties.
From equation (6.2), it first seems simplifying to specify linear f ′(y), that is f ′(y) = θy where
θ depicts the behavior toward risk. As, f = u−1, this corresponds to u(x) = 1θ
√
2θ(x− a) where a
represents the constant of integration. Then, to isolate the effect foresight, it appears useful to consider
a class of utility function for which (as in the CRRA case) the first best premium doesn’t depend on
the behavior toward risk parameter. To do so let us specify the constant a such that u′(1) = 1∀θ that
is a = 1− 12θ . Let us therefore consider the class of utility function:
u(x) =
1
θ
√
2θ(x− 1) + 1 , θ > 0 (6.3)
which is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave above some (subsistence) level 12
x ≡ 1− 12θ and satisfies the Inada conditions limx→xu
′(x) = +∞ and lim
x→+∞u
′(x) = 0.
12In this sense, this class of utility functions can be related to the Stone-Geary class
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An agent whose preferences is described by (6.3) is risk adverse
(
A =
θ
2θ(x− 1) + 1 > 0
)
,
prudent
(
P =
3θ
2θ(x− 1) + 1 > 0
)
and farsighted
(
P − 2A = θ
2θ(x− 1) + 1 > 0
)
for all level of
θ (positive). Moreover, if we consider two agents u and v having such preferences, v is more farsighted
than u (Pv − 2Av > Pu − 2Au ∀x > x) if and only if θv > θu.
The levels of wealth reached under the optimal incentive contract
(
that exists only if
ψ
∆p
<
1
pθ
)
then writes:
X l2
∗∗ = 1 + (1− p) ψ
∆p
+
1
2
(
(1− p) ψ
∆p
)2
θ
Xh2
∗∗ = 1− p ψ
∆p
+
1
2
(
p
ψ
∆p
)2
θ
X∗∗1 −X∗1 = 1− E (X∗∗2 ) = −
1
2
p (1− p)
(
ψ
∆p
)2
θ
Therefore,
Proposition 7 If agents’ preferences are defined by u(x) = 1θ
√
2θ(x− 1) + 1, θ > 0, an increase in
the degree of foresight
(i) increases first period premium
(ii) decreases second period premia
(iii) increase classification risk if the good state of health is the more likely (p > 1/2)
The use of a utility function whose reciprocal has a linear derivative allows us to better isolate the
impact of foresight. We can indeed relate the results of Proposition 7 with the effect highlighted in
Proposition 1. An increase in foresight (that is in P − 2A) increases the first period premium for pre-
caution motive (increase in P ) and/or because agents are less sensitive to the increase in classification
risk it may cause (decrease in A). The incentive effect of such an increase does not prevent - for this
class of utility function - from a decrease in both second period premia.
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Moreover, the increase in wealth is higher in the most probable state and therefore this increase
in the first period may not be coupled with an increase in classification risk if the bad state is highly
probable. The optimal incentive contract moreover confirms the result of Proposition 3 and 4 as here
(i) an increase in the cost of effort increases the first period premium and the classification risk (when
the optimal contract exists, that is when
ψ
∆p
<
1
pθ
) and (ii) an increase in the probability of being low
risk when exerting the effort decreases the classification risk and the optimal wealth in the good state.
7 The introduction of short-term (spot) insurance
Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) have pointed out that, in the absence of moral hazard, dynamic insurance
contracts are subject to lapsation in second period. Taking the feature into account, the timing our
model becomes
Figure 6: The timing of the game including interim participation choice
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In the absence of severance payment (proposed by Cochrane 1995), healthier agents may then
leave the dynamic contract to go to a competing short-term (spot) insurer that offers actuarially fair
premia. This will be the case if the optimal incentive premium for low risk agent is higher than their
expected health cost
(
Πl2
∗∗
> K l2
)
. The second period optimal contract presented previously however
does not depend on expected costs (the expected health costs over the two periods only influences the
first period premium). We can still infer that for a given expected health costs schedule, the lower the
premium offered by the mutual dynamic insurer, the lower the incentive for healthy agents to lapse
(and go to the spot insurer).
Therefore, from Proposition 2, the mutual insurer described here suffers from less lapsation if
effort is unobservable. Moreover, from Proposition 5 and 7:
Proposition 8 A mutual insurer that offers long-term contracts is more likely to be sustainable to
the competition of companies offering spot (short-term) contracts if it insures more farsighted agents,
when agents preferences
• are described by u(x) = 1θ
√
2θ(x− 1) + 1, θ > 0
• are CRRA, provided the cost of primary preventive effort is low enough
Our work also offers an alternative explanation to the various degrees of front-loading and of
lapsation observed in dynamic insurance contracts. In the empirical part of their work, Hendel and
Lizzeri (2003) show that in life insurance, more front-loading is associated with lower lapsation. They
then argue that this phenomenon can be explained by heterogeneity in agents’ income growth (that is
in the cost of front-loading). It appears from our model that this can also be explained by heterogeneity
in foresight. Program (4.5) indeed also fits with the problem of a competitive insurance company that
does not discount the future (in the zero profit condition (4.2)). In this case, it appears from our study
that the co-existence of dynamic contract with spot contract, and the various degree of front-loading
may be explained by moral hazard and heterogeneous foresight.
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Moreover, contracts of more farsighted agents may exhibits more front loading and less lapsation if
the reciprocal of agents’ utility function has a linear derivative (u(x) = 1θ
√
2θ(x− 1) + 1, θ > 0).
Simulations with CRRA utility function (cf. Appendix) seems to indicate that this would also be the
case when agents have CRRA preferences if the cost of primary preventive effort is low enough.
8 Allowing for Cross Subsidization:
A Step Toward Adverse Selection
A natural extension of our model consists in allowing for cross subsidization between agents with
heterogeneous preferences. Let us therefore study a situation where a mutual insurer dynamically
insures a population composed of two type of agents with respective utility functions u and v and
respective proportion λ and 1 − λ. Assuming the insurer is unable to distinguish between types and
can only offer a single (pooling) contract, the optimal incentive compatible contract is solution of
max
Π1,Πl2,Π
h
2
(R−Π1)− ψ + λ
[
pu
(
R−Πl2
)
+ (1− p)u
(
R−Πh2
)]
+ (1− λ)
[
pv
(
R−Πl2
)
+ (1− p)v
(
R−Πh2
)]
s.t.

Π1 + pΠl2 + (1− p)Πh2 ≥ K
u(R−Πl2)− u(R−Πh2) ≥
ψ
∆pi
v(R−Πl2)− v(R−Πh2) ≥
ψ
∆pi
To guarantee that only one incentive constraint will bind at the optimum, let us moreover assume
that agents of type v have a strictly lower preference for future, that is v′(x) < u′(x) ∀x. This
guarantees that the incentive constraint of agents with preferences u doesn’t bind at the optimum
(u(R−Πl2)− u(R−Πh2) > v(R−Πl2)− v(R−Πh2) ∀(Πl2,Πh2)).
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Then, the first order conditions of the program can be written as:
p
v′
(
R−Πl2
) + 1− p
v′
(
R−Πh2
) = λ+ (1− λ)
pu′
(
R−Πl2
)
v′
(
R−Πl2
) + (1− p)u′
(
R−Πh2
)
v′
(
R−Πh2
)

Reminding that we assume v′(x) < u′(x), this gives p
v′(R−Πl2)
+ 1−p
v′(R−Πh2)
> 1. As the incentive
constraint of agents of type v always binds at the equilibrium, the following proposition hold
Proposition 9 Allowing for cross subsidization between heterogeneous agents
• increases prepayment
• decreases second period premia
• increases classification risk
of agents with the lowest preference for future
By definition, the pooling contract provides arbitration between the preferences of the two types of
agents. In our setting, the agents with the lower preference for future are the most difficult to incite
and therefore drive the incentive compatibility of the contract. Reminding that in the plan (X l2, X
h
2 )
the incentive compatible constraint defines an increase curve that goes away from the 45◦ line as X l2
increase, Proposition 9 holds. Then, cross-subsidization has two main implications for the agents with
the lower preference for future. First, as it increases their second period wealth (in both states), cross-
subsidization lowers their incentive to leave the contract when they turn out to be low risk. It therefore
stabilizes the dynamic contract. This is however done at the cost of an increase in classification
risk, for this type of agents at least. Without further assumptions, we are unable to infer the impact of
cross-subsidization on the welfare of agents of type u (with a higher preference for future), as it would
highly depend on the relative degree of foresight of both type. The introduction of adverse selection
in our setting remains therefore an open issue that may call for some refinement in the model, as the
non-linearity of first period preferences or the full specification of the second period utility function.
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9 Applications to other insurance markets
The model presented above in the case of health insurance seems to be applicable to other insurance
markets with slight modifications.
9.1 Life insurance
A first application concerns life insurance. The considered insurer then offers a protection against the
risk of death, and agents can reduce the probability of having a high probability of death in second
period by exerting preventive effort. If we assume ad-hoc altruism (in the sense that the indemnity
paid to the beneficiary directly enters in the insured’s utility function), optimal insurance is complete in
each state and is solution of a program similar to 4.5. We however need to introduce in this extension
the fact that agents can die in first period (that is the survival probability). As q1 represents here
the risk of death in period 1, only a portion (1 − q1) of a generation is still alive in period 2. This
effect enters the objective, the incentive constraint and the zero profit condition such that the program
becomes
max
Π1,Πl2,Π
h
2
(R−Π1)− ψ + (1− q1)
[
pu
(
R−Πl2
)
+ (1− p)u
(
R−Πh2
)]
(9.1)
s.t.

Π1 + (1− q1)
[
pΠl2 + (1− p)Πh2
]
≥ K = q1R+ (1− q1)
[
pql2R+ (1− p)qh2R
]
u(R−Πl2)− u(R−Πh2) ≥
ψ
(1− q1)∆p
The solution of this new program, very similar to original one, is given by:

u(R−Πl2∗∗)− u(R−Πh2∗∗) =
ψ
(1− q1)∆p
p
u′
(
R−Πl2∗∗
) + 1− p
u′
(
R−Πh2∗∗
) = 1
1− q1
Π∗∗1 = K − pΠl2∗∗ − (1− p)Πh2∗∗ = K − E(Π∗∗2 )
(9.2)
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Then, all the above properties hold in the case of life insurance with (ad-hoc) altruistic agents.
Particularly, long term life insurance appears more stable relative to spot insurance as it insures more
farsighted agents. Moreover, the effect of q1 turns out to be ambiguous. If the probability of dying
during the first period decreases the relative valuation of the second period (and therefore tends to
decrease inter-generational insurance), it also reduces the proportion of agents that shares the prepaid
premia in second period (and then leads to an increase in second period wealth).
9.2 Unemployment insurance
With more amendments, our model also seems to be applicable to unemployment insurance.
Consider a social unemployment insurance in our simple overlapping generation model. In their
early part of life, all agents face the same probability of being unemployed (or have the same expected
length of unemployment) and can invest in training effort e. Partially based on this effort, agents can
then either be employed as a "skilled" (executive) or "unskilled" (non executive) worker in second pe-
riod. We moreover assume (as it seems to be the case in real economies) that the risk of unemployment
is higher among unskilled workers than among skilled ones. Modeling the fact that the three types of
agents also differ in wages, the income profile without insurance can be summarized as follows:
Figure 7: The income profile without unemployment insurance
with u1, uS2 and u
U
2 the respective probabilities of being unemployed for youth, skilled and un-
skilled workers ; and w1, wS2 and w
U
2 the respective wages of youth, skilled and unskilled workers.
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As in our baseline model, it is then optimal for the mutual (social) insurer to provide risk-adverse
agents with a complete insurance in each state that is with a triplet of sure consumption profiles C1,
CS2 et C
U
2 solution of
max
C1,CS2 ,C
U
2
(R− C1)− ψ + pu
(
CS2
)
+ (1− p)u
(
CU2
)
(9.3)
s.t.

C1 + pCS2 + (1− p)CU2 ≥ (1− u1)w1 + p(1− uS2 )wS2 + (1− p)(1− uU2 )wU2
u(CS2 )− u(CU2 ) ≥
ψ
(1− q1)∆p
where ψ represents the cost of exerting high effort, p and p being the respective probability of becom-
ing a skilled worker when exerting and not exerting the training effort. ∆p ≡ p− p.
Such a model allows studying the extent of intra- and inter-generational employment insurance.
This seems to be empirically relevant as evidences for both type of insurance can be found in France
for example. Indeed it appears that the employment benefit are, in France, equal to 75% of the
last gross wage for the lowest wage bracket and about 57% for the highest one. This is in step
with intragenerational insurance between skilled and unskilled workers. As these unemployment
benefits are larger for workers above 50 years old, this intragenerational insurance moreover seems to
combined with an intergenerational one.
In this setting, our model highlights a tradeoff between training effort and intergenerational in-
surance. Farsighted agents then prefer to rely on intergenerational insurance rather than on training
to deal with the risk of having longer unemployment duration in second period. This application
therefore seems to be linked to the actual debate on unemployment insurance (in particular in France)
about the tradeoff between unemployment benefits generosity and training subsidization. Moreover,
it appears through the preceding analysis that an increase in the efficiency of training or a decrease
in its cost enhances the optimal incentive compatible intragenerational insurance (by decreasing the
spread between CS2 and C
U
2 ). Finally, our work suggests that an increase in agents’ degree of fore-
sight decreases the redistributive pattern of unemployment insurance between skilled and unskilled
workers.
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10 Conclusion
We highlight in this paper the role of prudence and risk aversion on optimal dynamic insurance con-
tracts. To do so we define the notion of foresight as the difference between the index of absolute
prudence and twice the index of absolute risk aversion. Adding to usual models an effort of primary
prevention, we show that this notion plays a central role in defining the optimal level of prepay-
ment of premia and the optimal incentive compatible classification risk. First, our analysis states that
moral hazard always increases classification risk (relative to the complete information benchmark)
and increases first period premium (and thus may lead to more prepayment of premia) if agents are
farsighted. This reveals the tradeoff between primary prevention and (intergenerational) insurance
that arises from future uncertainty.
It moreover appears that the classification risk can be reduced by decreasing the cost of prevention
or by increasing the effectiveness of prevention (when agents are farsighted). Therefore, if it aims at
making insurance more affordable to high risk agents, the policy maker should seek at reducing the
cost of primary prevention and at increasing its efficiency.
Specifying CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) preferences we moreover show that an in-
crease in agents’ degree of foresight decreases the premium offered to low risk agents in second
period, if the cost of preventive effort is low enough. Then, the more farsighted its policyholders, the
more stable the mutual insurer when confronted to competing companies that offer short term con-
tracts. To go further in the analysis of comparative foresight, we specify a utility function that exhibits
the suitable property of having a linear reciprocal derivative. With such preferences, it appears that an
increase in agents’ degree of foresight optimally increases first period premium and decreases second
period premia. Heterogeneity in behavior toward risk therefore appears as an alternative explanation
of the properties of dynamic insurance contract observed by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003). We indeed
find that such heterogeneity can explain the different level of prepayment and the fact that contracts
with higher levels of prepayment is associated with lower lapsation. Whether this explanation is more
relevant that the heterogeneity in income growth put forward by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) remains
an open issue.
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Is left for future research to analyze the impact of heterogeneous foresight on adverse selection.
Preliminary work on this refinement highlights the importance of the relative time preferences. It
indeed appears that cross subsidization increases prepayment for the agents with the lower preference
for future and is therefore likely to stabilize the dynamic contract. In future work, it would then be
worthwhile to analyze the impact of heterogeneous degrees of foresight on this cross-subsidization.
Our analysis suggests that agents with a low degree of foresight would subsidy more farsighted agents.
In this case, the coexistence of mutual dynamic insurance with spot market (in first period) would be
explained by heterogeneous behaviors toward risk, the dynamic form being designed to insure the
most farsighted policyholders. However, this effect being coupled with the time preference effect we
just discussed, the effect of cross-subsidization is ambiguous. It therefore seams that the study of
adverse selection in dynamic contract call further assumptions and probably for the full specify of the
utility functions.
It also seems interesting to study the role of foresight on the optimal level of effort. In future work
it would indeed be worthwhile to analyze if more farsighted agents exert more primary preventive in
line with the work of Jullien et al. (1999) on the link between risk aversion and (secondary and tertiary)
prevention. Our work also seems to opens perspectives on the role of information. The information
on risk type takes an essential role in the writing of dynamic insurance contracts. It therefore seems
natural to study the impact of genetic testing and medical checkups in this area. Following Barigozzi
and Henriet (2008), policyholders would then choose on the one hand to undertake or not the tests
and on the other hand to reveal or not the results. The objective of future work would then be to study
the impact of these choices on the optimal level of effort and on the optimal dynamic contract. It
indeed seems interesting to study the value of information through the trade-off between the resulting
increases in effort and classification risk.
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Appendix: Simulations with CRRA preferences - The impact of foresight
on first period premium
Figure 8: ψ∆p = 1, p = 0, 9
Figure 9: ψ∆p = 1, p = 0, 2
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Figure 10: ψ∆p = 10, p = 0, 9
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